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Why do some electoral authoritarian regimes survive for decades while others become democracies? 
This article explores the impact of constitutional structures on democratic transitions from electoral 
authoritarianism. We argue that under electoral authoritarian regimes, parliamentary systems permit 
dictators to survive longer than they do in presidential systems. This is because parliamentary systems 
incentivize autocrats and ruling elites to engage in power sharing and thus institutionalize party 
organizations, and indirectly allow electoral manipulation to achieve an overwhelming victory at the 
ballot box, through practices such as gerrymandering and malapportionment. We test our hypothesis 
using a combination of cross-national statistical analysis and comparative case studies of Malaysia and 
the Philippines. Employing a cross-national dataset of 170 countries between 1946 and 2008, dynamic 
probit models provide supporting evidence that electoral authoritarianism within parliamentary 
systems is less likely to lead a country to democracy than within presidential systems. The results are 
robust to a battery of sensitivity tests, including instrumental variable estimation and additional 
controls. Two carefully selected case studies have been chosen for comparative analysis—Malaysia’s 
Barisan National (National Front) regime (1957 to present) and the Philippines’s electoral 
authoritarian regime (1978 to 1986)—which elucidate causal mechanisms in the theory. 
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1. Introduction 
In the wake of the Cold War, most authoritarian countries hold national elections that allow opposition 
parties to compete for and gain seats, despite a manipulated electoral system in favor of the dictators 
and their ruling parties. Although such authoritarian elections are often extensively rigged and do not 
allow the possibility of government turnover, the growing pressure from the international community 
no longer permits them to avoid holding periodical elections with the participation of opposition 
parties.1 This post-Cold War proliferation of “electoral authoritarianism”2 or “competitive 
authoritarianism”3 revived the study of authoritarian politics in the field of comparative politics. 
Nevertheless, there is a large variation in the durability of electoral authoritarian regimes. Some 
electoral authoritarian countries such as Malaysia (1957–present), Singapore (1965–present), 
Zimbabwe (1970–present), and Egypt (1979–2011) are examples in which dictators succeeded in 
staying in power for long periods of time, while other electoral authoritarian regimes in countries such 
as the Philippines (1978–1985), Kenya (1992–1997), Guatemala (1955–1957), and Honduras (1954–
1956) collapsed relatively soon after establishment, and were followed by democratic transitions. 
What explains these variations? 
 Many studies have found an answer to this question in seemingly democratic institutions such 
as legislatures, elections, and political parties. According to the burgeoning literature on this issue, 
these institutions contribute to authoritarian durability in a variety of ways: 
 
• Strong party organizations consolidating authoritarian rule4 by facilitating long-lasting power 
sharing between the dictator and ruling elites;5 
• Multi-party legislatures helping dictators make credible policy concessions toward opposition 
groups;6 
• Encouraging economic growth and providing opportunities for the citizenry to engage in 
economic distribution;7 
• Parliaments allowing authoritarian leaders to divide and conquer opposition camps;8 
• Authoritarian elections contributing to displaying regime strength by ensuring an 
overwhelming electoral victory;9 
• Gathering information on the distribution of popular support through electoral results.10 
 
Although scholars’ views differ considerably regarding the roles of quasi-democratic institutions, they 
agree that these institutions are not mere window dressing but do indeed benefit authoritarian leaders. 
In this paper, we focus on an institutional factor that helps explain the longevity of electoral 
authoritarian regimes, but which has escaped close scrutiny thus far: executive–legislative relations, or 
the distinction between parliamentary systems on the one hand and presidential and semi-presidential 
systems on the other. Briefly, the major difference between these two systems is this: in parliamentary 
systems, the chief executive is elected from, and accountable to, the legislature; while in 
presidential/semi-presidential systems the chief executive is chosen directly by voters and his tenure is 
                                                      
1 Norris, 2014, 78–81. 
2 Schedler (2013). 
3 Levitsky and Way (2010). 
4 Huntington (1968); Brownlee (2007); Geddes (1999). 
5 Magaloni (2008); Svolik (2012). 
6 Gandhi (2008); Gandhi and Przeworski (2007). 
7 Blaydes (2011); Magaloni (2006); Wright (2008). 
8 Lust-Okar (2004). 
9 Geddes (2006); Magaloni (2006); Simpser (2013);Wright (2008). 
10 Blaydes (2011); Cox (2009); Miller (2014); Reuter and Robertson (2012). 
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not dependent on parliamentary support. This difference under electoral authoritarianism, in our view, 
is as important as that in democracies. Specifically, we argue that this difference influences electoral 
authoritarian regimes with parliamentary systems to be less likely to democratize than those with 
presidential systems, for the following reasons. First, parliamentarism facilitates credible power 
sharing among ruling elites, often enabling dictators to institutionalize a dominant party. Deterring 
ruling elites’ defections from the regime, parliamentarism can effectively prevent democratic 
transitions. Second, most parliamentary elections have multiple electoral districts and thus dictators 
retain much more room to arbitrarily redistrict and apportion according to their interests and those of 
their parties compared with presidential elections. These indirect measures of electoral manipulation 
allow dictators to enjoy bias in parliamentary seats to maintain an overwhelming majority without 
relying on more risky and blatant electoral fraud, which often backfires on dictators.11 By allowing 
dictators to score an overwhelming majority by these indirect methods, parliamentarianism prevents 
democratization through elections. 
We empirically test our hypothesis through cross-national statistical analysis and comparative 
case studies of Malaysia and the Philippines. Our statistical analysis shows that electoral authoritarian 
regimes with parliamentarism are less likely to democratize than those with presidentialism. This 
statistical result is robust to a battery of sensitivity analysis such as instrumental variable (IV) 
estimation, different samples of electoral authoritarianism, various estimation methods, potential 
outliers, and additional control variables. We also provide additional cross-national evidence on the 
causal mechanisms that parliamentarism is more likely to generate dominant party regimes and less 
likely to engage in risky, blatant electoral fraud. Given their similarity as countries, comparative case 
studies of Malaysia and the Philippines elucidate causal mechanisms linking executive–legislative 
structures and the survival of electoral authoritarian regimes. 
This study contributes to the literature on authoritarian politics, on political institutions, and 
on regime change. First, we introduce a new factor to the body of knowledge on authoritarian politics 
that influences the survival of electoral authoritarian regimes, namely, the executive–legislative 
structure. Second, our focus on the executive–legislative structure provides a framework to understand 
how elections, parties, and legislatures serve to prolong the longevity of authoritarian regimes. Among 
existing studies, conflicting effects of these political institutions have been observed. For example, 
sometimes elections help dismantle authoritarian rule, but in other cases they are tools for autocrats to 
stay in power. By incorporating the executive–legislative structure, we provide a framework to 
cohesively understand conditions under which elections, parties, and legislatures help lengthen the 
time in power of authoritarian regimes. Further discussion on this point is found in the Conclusion. 
Third, the present research paves a way forward to approach the impact of executive–
legislative relations on regime transition. Starting from the seminal work by Juan Linz,12 a vast 
majority of literature on this topic has almost exclusively focused on democratic breakdown. 
Trichotomously categorizing political regimes (closed authoritarianism, electoral authoritarianism, and 
democracy), we show that the distinction between presidentialism/semi-presidentialism and 
parliamentarism is an important factor that influences regime transition from electoral authoritarianism 
to democracy. In this light, this study brings constitutional structures back to the study of regime 
transition. 
This paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we theorize the executive–legislative 
relationship and democratic transitions in electoral authoritarian countries and propose a testable 
hypothesis. In Section 3, we conduct cross-national statistical analysis, covering 170 countries from 
1946 to 2008, in order to empirically examine the hypothesis. Finally, comparative case studies of 
Malaysia and the Philippines follow to illuminate the causal mechanisms proposed in our theory. 
 
2. Executive–Legislative Structure and Democratic Transitions 
Two broad types of argument have been advanced to explain the survival of electoral authoritarianism. 
The first focuses on international factors. Scholars have emphasized the role of “international 
                                                      
11 Tucker (2007); Hafner-Burton et al. (2014).  
12 Linz (1990a) 
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diffusion”,13 foreign intervention such as the support for the promotion of democracy, conditions 
placed on aid, and electoral monitoring,14 and international ties such as trade and investment, as well 
as human exchange with Western democracies.15 The second type of argument looks at domestic 
politics. Among these, two strands exist. One of these emphasizes opposition strategies. For example, 
Howard and Rossler16 and Donno17 maintain that the formation of broad opposition coalitions 
significantly increases the chances of replacing competitive authoritarian regimes with electoral 
democracy. By studying post-Soviet countries, Bunce and Wolchik18 argue that in addition to having a 
unified opposition, the adoption of “sophisticated, intricately planned, and historically unprecedented 
electoral strategies”19 can maximize opposition votes in order to replace dictators. The second strand, 
related to domestic politics, is institutional. As discussed above, scholars have investigated how 
elections, political parties, and legislatures affect the longevity of authoritarian regimes. 
This study belongs to the institutionalist camp, and sheds light on an aspect that has escaped 
scholarly attention thus far: the executive–legislative structure.20 Specifically, we argue that electoral 
authoritarian regimes that adopt parliamentary systems tend to survive longer than those using a 
presidential or semi-presidential form of government, other things being equal. In parliamentary 
systems, the chief executive (prime minister) is elected by the legislature and his/her tenure depends 
on the confidence of the legislative majority. Presidential systems are characterized by the origin and 
survival of the executive being separate from the legislature: the chief executive (president) is directly 
elected by voters and does not rely on the confidence of the legislature for his/her survival. In semi-
presidentialism, there is a president elected by voters, and a prime minister elected by the legislature; 
the tenure of the prime minister depends on parliamentary confidence, while that of the president does 
not.21 We expect that these constitutional differences create the conditions for the following two 
mechanisms. 
First, parliamentarism is more conducive to institutionalizing the ruling party’s organization. 
While the notion of institutionalization in this context is difficult to define precisely,22 an 
institutionalized political party has a well-structured organization and the allegiance of its members to 
the party’s goals and decisions.23 Although not exactly adopting the concept of institutionalization, 
many have pointed out that systems with a directly elected chief executive tend to have less 
institutionalized parties than parliamentary systems.24 Empirically, Samuels and Shugart25 
convincingly demonstrate that presidential and semi-presidential systems tend to produce less 
institutionalized parties than parliamentary governments. When the chief executive is directly elected, 
which is the core feature of presidential and semi-presidential systems, parties tend to become 
“presidentialized.” In such parties, according to Samuels and Shugart,26 party organization and 
                                                      
13 Brinks and Coppedge (2006); Gleditsch and Ward (2006); Huntington (1993). 
14 Donno (2013); Kelley (2012); Pevehouse (2002). 
15 Levitsky and Way (2010); Eichengreen and Leblang (2008). In addition to international factors, Levitsky and Way also 
emphasize the “organizational power” of the incumbent regime. We discuss this as a separate group of theories. 
16 Howard and Rossler (2006). 
17 Donno (2013). 
18 Bunce and Wolchik (2010). 
19 The concrete examples include voter registration and turnover drives, monitoring procedures, and orchestrated political 
campaigns. 
20 For recent discussions on the importance of constitutional frameworks in authoritarian regimes in general, see Ginsburg 
and Simpser (2014). 
21 Shugart and Carey (1992). 
22 c.f. Randall and Svåsand (2002). 
23 Huntington (1968); Mainwaring and Scully (1995). 
24 Fujiwara (1994), 256–261; Linz (1990b), 89; Shugart (1998), 2. 
25 Samuels and Shugart (2010). 
26 ibid. 
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activities are strongly influenced to maximize the chances of winning presidential elections. For 
example, parties tend to field presidential candidates who may be new to the party but have a good 
chance of winning; to pursue vote-maximizing policies at the cost of promoting the party’s ideological 
positions; and to concentrate party resources on winning presidential elections rather than building the 
party as a whole. In combination, these features hinder the institutionalization of parties—both the 
ruling party and the opposition—in presidential and semi-presidential systems. 
When the ruling party in electoral authoritarianism is institutionalized well, the country is less 
likely to democratize. The institutionalized governing party serves as a device for credible power 
sharing among ruling elites.27 In such circumstances, the autocratic leader can credibly signal that he 
would not abuse his power against regime elites. For those elites within the ruling circle, they can 
expect their career ambitions to be fulfilled and to receive perks from being part of the regime in the 
future. When the ruling party functions in this way, regime elites have less incentive to defect to the 
opposition, and less interest in staging a palace coup to oust the ruler by force. At the same time, when 
the party is institutionalized, leadership succession takes place according to party rules: the 
resignation, death, or retirement of the chief executive is less likely to cause political disturbance, thus 
prolonging authoritarian rule. In addition, an institutionalized ruling party can facilitate efficient and 
effective distribution of patronage to voters, thereby contributing to winning big in elections.28 
Second, autocrats in parliamentary systems have a wider variety of electoral maneuvering 
tactics than those in presidential/semi-presidential systems. Scholars have pointed out that there are 
three main types of electoral malpractice: manipulation of electoral rules, manipulation of vote choice, 
and manipulation of electoral administration.29 It is in the first type that parliamentary autocrats enjoy 
an advantage over their presidential counterparts. This happens because presidents are elected directly 
by voters from a single nationwide constituency,30 while a parliamentary majority elects the prime 
minister. What this means is that, in order to remain in power, presidents need to win at least a 
plurality of votes among the electorate, while prime ministers need to have their party win a plurality 
of seats in legislative elections. 
Against this backdrop, prime ministers can resort to two additional strategies of manipulation 
that presidents cannot. The first is malapportionment, which refers to a disproportionate allocation of 
legislative seats in light of the number of people making up the electorate. The ruling party can 
apportion a larger number of seats to their bailiwicks in order to win a greater number of seats with a 
fewer numbers of votes. The second is gerrymandering—drawing district boundaries in a politically 
calculated manner. Typically, the ruling party can minimize the number of opposition seats by packing 
opposition supporters into districts where the ruling party is certain to win, and/or splitting the 
opposition stronghold into several districts that the opposition would lose. While malapportionment 
and gerrymandering can also exist in legislative elections in presidential systems, legislative elections 
under presidentialism are beyond the scope of our analyses because they do not affect the choice of the 
chief executive (president). One precondition for such strategies is that legislative elections do not use 
a proportional representation (PR) electoral formula with a nationwide single constituency. In such an 
electoral system, technically speaking, neither malapportionment nor gerrymandering can occur. 
Nevertheless, electoral authoritarian regimes that use nationwide PR are few in number.31 
Malapportionment and gerrymandering can facilitate the survival of the electoral authoritarian 
regime in several ways. First, autocrats have less need to rely on more direct, blatant electoral 
manipulation such as electoral violence and tampering with the ballot box; thus, there is less chance of 
                                                      
27 Magaloni (2006, 2008). 
28 Magaloni (2006), Greene (2009). 
29 Birch (2011); Schedler (2002). 
30 Exceptions are those presidential elections that use an electoral college as in the United States, and Argentina until the 
1994 presidential election. 
31 In our sample of countries, Kyrgyz (2007–present), Kazakhstan (2007–present), Peru (2000–2006) and Russia (2005–
present) use such an electoral rule. As we show later in robustness checks, our main results remain robust even if we 
exclude these countries from our sample. 
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mass protests that could result in democratic transitions. Second, they facilitate the appearance of the 
“overwhelming victory” of the ruling party,32 as the percentage of seats won by the winning party is 
disproportionately larger than the percentage of votes in highly malapportioned and/or gerrymandered 
elections. Third, they allow for a “spurious majority,” which refers to election results where a party 
wins a majority of seats while another party wins the majority of votes.33 As we discuss later, 
Malaysia’s general election in 2013 yielded a spurious majority where the ruling Barisan Nasional 
(National Front, hereafter BN) coalition won fewer votes than the opposition coalition Pakatan Rakyat 
(People’s Pact), but BN still won the majority of seats. If the same result was obtained in a presidential 
or semi-presidential election, the opposition would have seized power and democratization would be 
the likely result.34 
As far as we are aware, this paper is the first comprehensive attempt to investigate the link 
between executive–legislative relations and democratic transitions. In a recently published article, 
Roberts35 examined a similar argument—presidential authoritarian regimes are shorter-lived than 
parliamentary counterparts—yet his analyses differ from ours in several important respects. First, he is 
concerned with the change in autocratic regimes, but not necessarily the transition to democracy, as 
we are. Second, he limited his theory to party-based authoritarian regimes, excluding military and 
personalist regimes.36 Our theoretical argument applies to electoral authoritarian regimes in general, 
which includes military and personalist sub-categories, while excluding closed authoritarian regimes. 
We believe the logic provided here should apply to all sub-categories of authoritarian regimes as long 
as regular and somewhat competitive elections are held. Third, our analyses cover a longer time 
period, from 1945 to 2008, while Roberts’ data spans from 1975 to 2012. As we show later, as a 
robustness check, it turns out that by utilizing this more extensive dataset the executive—legislative 
structure better explains democratic transitions rather than autocratic breakdown. In short, our analyses 
are concerned with the issue of democratic transitions and cover a wider range of sub-regime 
categories and time periods.37 
The argument we make parallels the debate on the “perils of presidentialism,” which relates to 
the stability of democracy in developing countries.38 In analyzing the factors influencing democratic 
stability, scholars have debated whether parliamentary systems lead to stability while presidentialism 
is prone to democratic breakdown.39 Empirical analyses have not yielded conclusive results, with some 
showing parliamentary stability,40 while others show that presidentialism per se is not the cause of 
democratic breakdown,41 but is instead the product of presidentialism combined with other political 
factors.42 Our argument suggests that executive–legislative relations may not only affect the stability 
of democratic regimes but also have an impact on democratic transitions from electoral authoritarian 
regimes, as we posit that the institutions regulating executive–legislative relations exert a similar 
influence in the context of limited, but not entirely limited, electoral competition. At the same time, it 
                                                      
32 Magaloni (2006); Simpser (2013). 
33 Siaroff (2003). 
34 One exception to the rule is presidential elections in the United States. As a result of the adoption of an electoral college 
with a plurality system in most states, the actual winner can receive fewer popular votes, as happened in the case of Al 
Gore vs. George W. Bush in 2000. 
35 Roberts (2015). 
36 cf. Geddes et al. (2014). 
37 In addition to Roberts (2015), Templeman (2012) makes a similar argument about the effect of executive–legislative 
relations on the longevity of one-party dominant regimes, but his scope of analyses covers both democracies and 
autocracies. 
38 Linz (1990a).  
39 Horowitz (1990); Lijphart (1991); Linz (1990a). 
40 Stepan and Skach (1993); Przeworski et al. (2000). 
41 Cheibub (2007). 
42 Mainwaring (1993); Shugart and Carey (1992). 
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should be noted that we expect these effects to be seen only in electoral authoritarianism, but not the 
closed variant. This is because we expect that the above two mechanisms emanating from the 
presidential-parliamentary difference only occur when some degree of electoral competition is present. 
In closed authoritarian regimes, by definition, there is no electoral competition where a real (not 
pseudo-regime) opposition has a chance of winning a seat. 
 
3. Cross-National Statistical Analyses 
Following recent studies on authoritarian regimes, we assume that there are at least two subtypes of 
authoritarian regime in light of their electoral competitiveness. The first is the closed authoritarian 
regime where there is no meaningful electoral competition.43 The second subtype is the electoral 
authoritarian regime in which there is a certain level of electoral competition but the competition is 
severely limited in favor of the ruling party. Adding the democratic regime category gives a threefold 
categorization: (1) democracy, (2) electoral authoritarianism, and (3) closed authoritarianism. To 
empirically identify these three types of political regimes in a rigorous way, we rely on the following 
two measurements of political regimes. 
The first measure is based on the work of Kinne and Marinov,44 in which they make a 
trichotomous measure of political regimes by combining Przeworski’s definition of democracy with 
Hyde and Marinov’s45 measure of electoral competition. According to the dataset by Przeworski et 
al.,46 and an extended version of that by Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland,47 a country is regarded as 
democratic if it satisfies the following four conditions: (1) the executive is elected, (2) the legislature 
is elected, (3) there is more than one political party, and (4) an incumbent regime has lost power. 
Otherwise, the country is deemed authoritarian. Although useful to distinguish democracy from 
autocracy, the dataset does not allow us to disaggregate the data to see which conditions authoritarian 
countries fail to satisfy and thus why they are categorized as authoritarian. To fill this gap and 
distinguish electoral authoritarian regimes from closed authoritarianism, we use Hyde and Marinov’s48 
National Elections across Democracy and Autocracy (NELDA). NELDA enables us to identify 
whether authoritarian elections allow ex ante electoral uncertainty, or competition, and therefore is 
useful in further categorizing authoritarian regimes. Following Hyde and Marinov49 and Kinne and 
Marinov,50 within authoritarian regimes we code a country as electoral authoritarian if its national 
elections meet all of the following three conditions: (1) opposition parties are allowed to participate in 
elections, (2) more than one party is legal, and (3) there is a choice of candidates on the ballot. If an 
authoritarian country fails to meet at least one of these three conditions, the country is regarded as a 
“closed” authoritarian regime. When all the three conditions are satisfied, then the authoritarian 
country is an “electoral” authoritarian regime. Referring to these definitions, we categorize all the 
country-year observations from 1945 to 2010 as closed authoritarian, electoral authoritarian, or 
democracy. 
The second way to categorize political regimes is by using criteria originally proposed by 
Brownlee.51 He uses the World Bank’s Database of Political Institutions (DPI)52 and constructs a 
                                                      
43 In some closed authoritarian regimes, parties other than the ruling party may participate and win seats in elections, as in 
China and Vietnam. However, their presence does not satisfy the conditions to classify them as electoral authoritarian, 
because these parties are regime-supported and electoral competition is not substantially meaningful. 
44 Kinne and Marinov (2013). 
45 Hyde and Marinov (2012). 
46 Przeworski et al. (2000). 
47 Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland (2009). 
48 Hyde and Marinov (2012). 
49 ibid. 
50 Kinne and Marinov (2013). 
51 Brownlee (2009). 
52 Beck et al. (2001); Brownlee (2009) covers the period between 1975 and 2006. 
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dummy variable for the presence of limited multi-party elections in authoritarian regimes. According 
to his definition, a country is electoral authoritarian if the DPI codes its national elections such that (1) 
multiple parties are legal but only one party wins seats; (2) multiple parties win seats but the largest 
party receives more than 75% of the seats; or (3) the largest party get less than 75% of the seats. 
Conversely, authoritarian regimes are viewed as closed if (1) there is no legislature; (2) there is an 
unelected executive/legislature; (3) although there is an elected executive/legislature, only one 
candidate is allowed; or (4) although multiple candidates run for the election, there is only one 
political party. While dichotomously distinguishing democracies from autocracies, Svolik also updates 
this DPI variable by expanding time periods to 1946–2008.53 We thus use Svolik’s dataset to create 
trichotomous political regimes (democracy, electoral authoritarianism, and closed authoritarianism).54t 
 
Figure 1: Time Series Trends in Political Regimes and Executive—Legislative Relations  
 
Note: Political regimes in Figure 1-(a) are from authors’ coded data based on Hyde and Marinov55 and Kinne 
and Marinov.56 Dichotomous categorization of executive–legislative relations (presidentialism and 
parliamentarism) is based on the DPI and the authors’ coded data. 
 
Figure 1-(a) shows time series changes in political regimes using Kinne and Marinov’s trichotomous 
categorization. Consistent with Schedler57, the graph tells us that the proportion of electoral 
authoritarianism tends to become larger after the end of the Cold War (1990: 14.7%, 2010: 31.6%), 
whereas the proportion of closed authoritarianism, which had been the dominant form of dictatorship 
before the 1990s, tends to shrink (1990: 42.2%, 2010: 11.1%). 
Our variable of interest is executive–legislative relations, that is, the difference between 
parliamentary systems on the one hand, and between presidential and semi-presidential systems on the 
other. We use the SYSTEM variable in the World Bank’s DPI58 to code executive–legislative relations 
in our sample countries. The SYSTEM variable distinguishes three types of executive–legislative 
relations: (1) parliamentary, (2) assembly-elected president, and (3) presidential systems. A country is 
coded parliamentary when the legislature elects the chief executive. A system of assembly-elected 
president refers to a government where the assembly-elected chief executive (president) cannot be 
“easily recalled.”59 A country is presidential when chief executives are elected directly by the voters 
                                                      
53 Svolik (2012). 
54 Svolik’s (2012) measure of political regimes is highly correlated with Kinne and Marinov’s (2013) (r = 0.89), suggesting 
that they have high measurement validity. 
55 Hyde and Marinov (2012). 
56 Kinne and Marinov (2013). 
57 Schedler (2013). 
58 Beck et al. (2001). 
59 The conditions here are (1) if a two-thirds vote is needed to impeach the chief executive, or (2) the legislature must 
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or by an electoral college. In the DPI, a country that has both a directly elected president and an 
assembly-elected prime minister is classified as presidential if the president can veto legislation and 
the legislature needs a supermajority to override the veto, or if they can appoint and dismiss the prime 
minister and dissolve parliament. In light of the standard definitions of parliamentary, presidential, and 
semi-presidential systems discussed above, the DPIs (1) and (2) are parliamentary, and (3) incorporate 
both presidential and semi-presidential systems. Thus, we create a dummy variable called “executive–
legislative relations,” which is coded 1 if a country is either parliamentary or assembly-elected in the 
DPI, and 0 if a country is presidential, that is, a presidential or semi-presidential system in the 
conventional terminology of the literature on comparative presidentialism. While the DPI covers the 
period 1975–2008, we expand our coverage to 1946–2008 using various data sources (see Appendix 
E) and follow the DPI’s classification schemes. Figure 1-(b) shows time series changes in executive–
legislative relations (presidentialism and parliamentalism) among electoral authoritarian regimes 
between 1946 and 2008.60 
Our analysis includes a host of control variables. One of the most important variables 
explaining democratization is economic development.61 While Przeworki et al.62 famously argue that 
the level of economic development does not induce democratic transition but helps countries sustain 
democratic regimes, other scholars contend that economic prosperity is also conducive to democratic 
transition.63 The level of economic prosperity is measured by the natural log of GDP per capita.64 
Membership of international organizations may also affect a country’s democratization prospects. If 
the country joins international organizations that include many democratic countries, then political 
pressure in favor of democratization would be strong.65 We measure international pressures for 
democratization by identifying each country’s membership of international organizations at each year 
using the State System Membership Dataset by the Correlates of War Project (2011 version).66 We 
then calculate how democratic each international organization is by taking the average of ACLP’s 
measure of democracy for all member states other than the country under study. Third, the extent to 
which the country is economically interdependent with other countries has been emphasized in the 
studies of democratization and authoritarian politics.67 Trade openness is introduced in our models by 
using the sum of total imports and total exports, measured as a percentage of the country’s GDP. The 
data source is the Penn World Table 7.1.68 Researchers have argued that natural resource wealth 
enables dictators to prevent democratization because such unearned income can improve the capability 
of authoritarian leaders to distribute economic resources and strengthen the military without taxing 
citizens69, while other scholars argue that natural resource wealth either does not affect 
democratization70 or its effect is conditional.71 To control for the impact of natural resource 
endowment on regime change, oil and gas value per capita in constant 2000 dollars is included in 
models.72 The oil–gas variable is calculated by multiplying a country’s total oil–gas production by the 
                                                      
60 In Appendix D, we also show which system each electoral authoritarian country adopted during the same period of time. 
61 Lipset (1959). 
62 Przeworki et al. (2000). 
63 Boix (2011); Boix and Stokes (2003); Epstein et al. (2006). 
64 Bolt and van Zanden (2013). 
65 Pevehouse (2002). 
66 Membership of international organizations between 1945 and 1965 is identified every five years, so the first year’s score in 
each five-year interval is used to cover the rest of the four years (for instance, for the period 1946–1949, the score in 
1945 is used). 
67 Eichengreen and Leblang (2008); Levitsky and Way (2010). 
68 Heston et al. (2012). 
69 Ross (2012). 
70 Haber and Menaldo (2011). 
71 Dunning (2008). 
72 Ross (2012). 
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current oil–gas price and then dividing this by the total population. To smooth the distribution of the 
oil–gas variable, the variable is logged after adding 1. Finally, to capture the impact of the effects of 
learning on political leaders, we include the leader’s length of tenure. As authoritarian leaders with 
longer tenure might be better at dealing with regime crisis, the longer a leader stays in power, the more 
resilient the country may be to democratization. We measure a leader’s tenure length using Archigos 
(version 2.9.), constructed by Goemans et al.73 In addition to these control variables, we run additional 
models that include other relevant control variables as robustness checks. 
 
Statistical Methodology 
We explore whether parliamentarism lowers the probability of democratization in electoral 
authoritarian regimes. Following previous literature, we employ a dynamic probit model to address 
this question, while using time series cross-section data (TSCS data) covering a maximum of 170 
countries in the period 1946–2008. 
Previous work on democratization74 has used Markov regressions or dynamic probit (logit) 
models after categorizing political regimes dichotomously (democracy and dictatorship). This study, 
however, employs a three-state model that allows us to estimate six different regime transitions: closed 
authoritarianism to electoral authoritarianism, electoral authoritarianism to democracy, and closed 
authoritarianism to democracy, as well as the reverse of each.75 
The dynamic probit model estimates the probability of moving from any given state to another 
state in a single period of time.76 This model assumes that the conditions existing in one period can 
have an impact on the probability of different types of regime transition in the subsequent period. 
Since we are particularly interested in regime transitions from electoral authoritarianism to democracy, 
we focus on the following equation that models transition from electoral authoritarianism at t−1 period 




where EA and D denote electoral authoritarianism and democracy, respectively.77 Considering the 
likelihood that errors are correlated within each unit (country), we report clustered robust standard 
errors. As the dependent variable is binary, employing country fixed effect models leads to dropping 
countries that have never experienced regime change during the period, which may bias the results. 
Furthermore, in many electoral authoritarian countries, executive–legislative relationships do not 
change over time (See Appendix D); therefore, it is difficult to distinguish the within-group effects 
from the between-group effects by using country fixed effects models. Hence, we do not use country 
fixed effects models to control for country-specific heterogeneous effects that do not temporarily 
change. Instead of adopting country-level fixed effects models, we introduce five regional dummies78 
to take into account regional-specific heterogeneous effects. Moreover, we include 5-year interval 
dummies to control for temporal-specific confounding factors. In addition to dynamic probit models, 
we show the results of standard probit regressions. 
                                                      
73 Goemans et al. (2009). 
74 Przeworski et al. (2000); Boix (2003); Dunning (2008); Houle (2009). 
75 It is our understanding that Epstein et al. (2006) is the only study that uses the same three-state model to address 
democratic transition and consolidation, but the authors’ way of categorizing political regimes is different from our study. 
Using Polity IV scores, they categorized democracy, partial democracy, and autocracy without drawing attention to 
possible differences within authoritarian regimes. 
76 Our statistical method is largely based on Epstein et al. (2006). For more details on how to model and interpret three-state 
dynamic logit models, see Appendix B. 
77 For more details about how to interpret three-state dynamic probit models, see Appendix B. 
78 More specifically, we include the western world (Western Europa, North America, and Japan), East European countries, 
Latin American countries, Sub-Saharan Africa, and Asia as regional dummies, setting North Africa and the Middle East 
as the reference category. 
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One may wonder whether weak autocrats facing serious threats of democratization will adopt 
presidential systems to strengthen their power and thus there might be a possibility of reverse 
causation between executive–legislative relationships and democratization. To deal with these 
endogeneity concerns, we employ instrumental variable (IV) probit estimation. Colonial origins 
strongly influence what executive–legislative relationships a country adopts after independence and 
contemporary democratization does not change their old colonial masters. Therefore, the former 
colonial power of each country is a very good candidate as an instrumental variable. Specifically, 
while countries that were British colonies are very likely to have inherited parliamentary systems from 
the British Empire,79 countries under French and Spanish dominance tended to adopt presidential 
systems. Exploiting this historical legacy, our IV probit model first predicts the likelihood of adopting 
parliamentary systems by including the dummies of British and French colonies80 from Hensel’s 
ICOW Colonial History Dataset.81 In the second model, we regress democratic transitions on the 




Table 1: Parliamentarism Prevents Democratic Transitions from Electoral Authoritarianism 
 
 
Note: P-values in parentheses. For dynamic probit models (Models 1–4), p-values are computed using clustered 
robust standard errors and a joint Chi-squared test for the variable of interest and its interaction with a regime 
type at (t−1) year. ***denotes significance at 0.01; **denotes significance at 0.05; *denotes significance at 0.1. 
All included variables are lagged by one year. For guidance on how to model three-state dynamic probit models, 
see Appendix B. The “executive–legislative relations” variable is a dummy variable (0: presidential systems, 1: 
                                                      
79 Wiseman (1990), 21; Cheibub (2007), 150–151.  
80 We could not include the dummy of Spanish colony in the first model because the dummy perfectly predicts the emergence 
of presidentialism. 
81 Hensel (2014). For details on the first model, see Appendix G.  
82 Because the models become too complicated to estimate if we combine dynamic probit models with two-stage IV probit 
estimation, we here use a standard probit regression after limiting the sample to electoral authoritarian regimes. In 
addition, since both the instruments and the dependent variable are binary, we cannot use standard IV probit models 
packaged in STATA 13. Thus, we use Roodman’s (2011) conditional mixed process (CMP) regression in which we can 
flexibly construct simultaneous equation models, including variables with continuous, ordinal, and binary scales on both 
sides of each equation.  
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assembly-elected president or parliamentary systems). Using conditional mixed process (CMP) regression83, 
Models 7 and 8 estimate IV probit models by setting British and French colonies as instruments for the 
executive–legislative relations dummy. 
 
Figure 2: Predicted Probabilities of Democratic Transitions 
Note: Figures 2-(a) and 2-(b) are drawn based on the results of Models 5 and 6, respectively. 
 
Table 1 shows our main results. Using different measurements of electoral authoritarianism, Models 1 
and 2 each estimate the impact of executive–legislative relations on democratic transition from 
electoral authoritarian regimes, without including relevant control variables. The coefficient is 
negative and statistically significant at the 0.1% level, suggesting that parliamentary systems are 
negatively correlated with the probability of democratic transitions from electoral authoritarianism. 
Dynamic probit models 3 and 4 then include all the relevant control variables and again find that 
parliamentary systems are negatively correlated with the probability of democratization from electoral 
authoritarian rule. 
Models 5 and 6 estimate standard probit regressions by restricting the sample to electoral 
authoritarian regimes. The results again show that electoral autocracies with parliamentarism are less 
likely to democratize in both models. Figures 2-(a) and (b) graphically show differences in the 
predicted probabilities of democratic transitions from electoral authoritarianism between presidential 
and parliamentary systems. If an electoral authoritarian country adopts a presidential system, the 
probability of democratic transition in the next year is 3.5%–7%. The cases in point are Guatemala 
(1954-1958; 1985-1986), Panama (1982-1989), Ecuador (1972-1979), Bolivia (1971-1979), Argentina 
(1958-1963), Serbia (1991-2000), Ghana (1981-1993), the Central African Republic (1981-1993), 
Kyrgyzstan (1991-2005), Pakistan (1999-2008), and the Philippines (1978-1986). Conversely, the 
probability that an electoral authoritarian country with a parliamentary system will transition to 
democracy at t year is only 0.78%–2.2%, meaning that electoral authoritarian regimes with 
parliamentary systems are 2.7%–4.8% less likely to democratize than those with presidential systems. 
Examples of stable authoritarian regimes with parliamentary systems are Togo (1967-2008), 
Zimbabwe (1980-2008), Botswana (1966-2008), Egypt (1980-2008), Malaysia (1957-2008), 
Singapore (1965-2008), and Indonesia (1966-1999). These results remain robust in the IV probit 
estimation where we use British and French colonial origins as instrumental variables for executive–
legislative relationships (Models 7 and 8. See also Appendix G). 
Among the control variables, membership of democratic international organizations tends to 
have a significant effect on the dependent variable. Leadership tenure is only positively correlated 
with the probability of democratic transition in Model 3, suggesting that electoral autocrats who are in 
power longer tend to experience democratization, but this finding is not well supported in Models 4–6. 
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Figure 2-(b) Democratic Transitions in BS Sample
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The coefficient of economic development is positive and statistically significant in Model 3 but it is 
negative or statistically insignificant in other models. Trade openness and natural resource wealth have 
an insignificant impact on both democratic transitions. As previous studies suggest,84 the coefficient of 




In order to ensure the robustness of the statistical results presented above, we investigate additional 
issues: (1) comparison between our model and Roberts’85, (2) alternative estimation methods of panel 
data analysis, (3) potential heteroscedasticity within regions, (4) time dependence, (5) influential 
outliers, (6) inclusion of additional control variables, and (7) potential spurious correlations.86 
Democratization is one form of authoritarian breakdown and thus one may wonder whether executive–
legislative relations explain autocratic breakdown in general, as suggested by Roberts. Using our 
dataset, which covers a more extensive time period (1946–2008) than Roberts’,87 we replicate Roberts’ 
study and then compare his model of authoritarian breakdown with our models in which the dependent 
variable is democratic transitions. We include almost the same set of control variables,88 as well as an 
estimation method89 identical to Roberts’. Random effects logit models indicate that parliamentarism 
tends to decrease the probability of democratic transitions in statistically significant ways, which is 
consistent with the results presented above. Conversely, negative associations between 
parliamentarism and authoritarian breakdown do not reach the 10% statistical significance level 
(Appendix Table C-1). This suggests that executive–legislative relationships might be more relevant in 
explaining democratic transitions than authoritarian breakdown. 
We also adopt random effects dynamic probit models that account for the likelihood that the 
effects of the main variables may differ systematically for each country (Appendix Table C-2). This 
alternative estimation method does not change the main results. Instead of probit regressions, we also 
alternatively adopt another functional form of non-linear regression, namely, logit models, to examine 
if the results are sensitive to our choice of functional form. Results produced by dynamic logit models 
are virtually identical to those of dynamic probit models (Appendix Table C-3). 
As Eichengreen and Leblang90 and Levistky and Way91 argued, the likelihood of democratic 
transition may change depending on the geographical proximity to the “West” or the country’s 
regional location. This may make measurement errors correlate within each region, which possibly 
induces an underestimation of standard errors. Thus, instead of clustered standard errors by country, 
we adopt robust standard errors clustered by region; however, the main results do not change 
(Appendix Table C-4). We also deal with potential autocorrelation by introducing either time lapse 
since the last democratic transition and three cubic splines92 or cubic time polynomials,93 yet the main 
results remain unchanged (Appendix Table C-5). 
We exclude each electoral authoritarian country consecutively to investigate whether our 
results change as a result of some influential outliers, although exclusion of any country does not 
                                                      
84 For example, Ross (2012). 
85 Roberts (2015). 
86 Regarding model specifications for each additional estimation, see Appendix C. 
87 Following Roberts (2015), we here restrict our sample to non-monarchical electoral authoritarian regimes by excluding 
monarchical autocracies based on Geddes et al. (2014). 
88 Different from Roberts (2015), only foreign aid per capita could not be summed up with natural resource wealth per capita 
to measure unearned incomes because the foreign aid variable does not cover the period before the 1970s. 
89 Here we employ random effects logit models with cubic time polynomials. 
90 Eichengreen and Leblang (2008). 
91 Levistky and Way (2010). 
92 Beck, Katz, and Tucker (1998). 
93 Carter and Signorino (2010). 
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affect the results. We also introduce additional control variables that are deemed important in studies 
of democratization to ensure our empirical tests are not vulnerable to omitted variable bias. We 
include economic growth, logged population, urban population (% of total population residing in 
urban areas, and Ethno-Linguistic Fractionalization),94 and the result indicates that the executive–
legislative relations variable is still negative and highly statistically significant (Appendix Table C-6). 
We test whether our results are driven by spurious correlations with military regimes. Cheibub 
argues that presidentialism itself does not necessarily lead to democratic breakdown but that military 
intervention is more likely to occur under presidential systems, which makes presidential democracies 
vulnerable to collapse.95 Presidentialism is also frequently observed in military dictatorships, and 
military dictatorships are more likely to break down.96 Therefore, limiting our sample to electoral 
authoritarian countries,97 we estimate standard probit regressions to check whether authoritarian 
regime types influence our main results (Web Appendix C-6). Even after controlling for regime types 
of military, party-based, and personalist regimes,98 parliamentarism still has a negative effect on 
democratic transition in statistically significant ways. 
 
Testing Causal Mechanisms: Dominant Party Emergence and Electoral Transparency in 
Parliamentary Electoral Authoritarianism 
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Figure 3-(b) Electoral Fraud
 
Note: For detailed estimation results, see Appendix E. 
 
We have argued that two mechanisms exist through which electoral autocracies with parliamentarism 
are less likely to democratize. First, parliamentarism is more likely to incentivize ruling elites to 
engage in power sharing through institutionalized party organizations and thus often lead to the 
construction of a dominant party. Second, as parliamentary elections are often divided into various 
constituencies, autocrats can engage in gerrymandering and enjoy a larger seat bias generated by 
                                                      
94 Roeder (2001). 
95 Cheibub (2007). 
96 Geddes (1999). 
97 As the variables of autocratic regime types are missing for democratic countries, we cannot estimate dynamic probit 
models. 
98 Geddes et al. (2014). The reference category is monarchical regimes. 
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malapportionment. These indirect techniques of electoral manipulation enable them to win elections 
with fewer votes and thus prevent democratization through elections. To statistically test the first 
mechanism, our additional statistical analysis estimates the impact of executive–legislative 
relationships on the emergence of dominant party regimes.99 Here the dependent variable is whether a 
country has a dominant party regime, which is measured using Geddes et al.100 We use probit 
regressions (Appendix Table E-1). 
It is extremely difficult to directly test the second mechanism because there is no extensive 
data on gerrymandering and malapportionment that cross-nationally covers electoral authoritarian 
regimes. There is one possible observable implication, however, which can empirically confirm if the 
second mechanism is working: in elections under parliamentary systems, autocrats may not need to 
use extensive electoral fraud because other indirect manipulation techniques (i.e., malapportionment 
and gerrymandering) are available to facilitate an election victory. As electoral fraud is risky,101 
autocrats holding such indirect manipulation tools should be less likely to engage in blatant fraud at 
the ballot box. To empirically assess this, we regress electoral fraud on a series of covariates, 
including the executive–legislative relations dummy variable. To measure electoral fraud, we use 
Hyde and Marinov’s NELDA,102 in which the authors provide a dichotomous assessment of whether 
there are significant concerns that elections will not be free and fair before elections (NELDA 11). The 
unit of analysis used here is country-election year, and we adopt probit regressions with a series of 
relevant control variables explaining electoral fraud.103 
Figure 3 presents cross-national statistical evidence for the two causal mechanisms. Even after 
controlling for relevant confounding factors, using different estimation methods and adopting an 
instrumental variables approach (Appendix Table E-1), the executive–legislative relations dummy is 
strongly and positively correlated with the emergence of a dominant party, suggesting that countries 
adopting parliamentary systems tend to construct dominant party regimes. Figure 3a shows that while 
in presidentialism, the probability that an autocrat constructs a dominant party is less than 50%, 
approximately 80% of authoritarian leaders with parliamentarism succeed in building up dominant 
party regimes.104 Many parliamentary autocracies tend to have dominant party organizations, including 
Gambia, Ethiopia, Zimbabwe, Botswana, Egypt, Taiwan, Cambodia, Malaysia, Singapore, and 
Indonesia.      
Figure 3b shows that electoral autocrats with parliamentary systems tend to rely less on 
electoral fraud. Under parliamentarism, only around 40% of elections in electoral authoritarianism 
tend to be rigged with serious electoral malpractice. For instance, in some electoral authoritarian 
regimes such as Gambia, Botswana, Egypt (1979), Taiwan (1991, 1995), Cambodia (1998, 2003), 
Malaysia, Singapore, and Indonesia, electoral fraud tends to be less extensive. On the other hand, in 
presidentialism more than 60% of autocratic elections are manipulated with autocrats allegedly 
engaging in electoral fraud. Electoral authoritarian regimes with presidentialism are likely to 
experience blatant electoral fraud, including Haiti, Guatemala, El Salvador, Bolivia, Serbia, Georgia, 
Azerbaijan, Central African Republic, Kenya, Ethiopia, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan and the 
Philippines. This result remains robust with different estimation methods and different samples of 
autocratic elections (Appendix Table E-2). 
 
 
                                                      
99 For details on model specification, see Appendix Table E-1. 
100 Geddes et al. (2014). 
101 Tucker (2007). 
102 Hyde and Marinov’s (2012). 
103 For details on model specification, see Appendix Table E-2. 
104 This result suggests that parliamentarism and dominant party emergence are not randomly assigned to each country, but 
the former is highly likely to bring the latter. In this respect, our findings are different from Roberts’ (2015), arguing that 
the causal effect of parliamentarism on authoritarian breakdown tends to be magnified if autocrats are armed with 
dominant parties. 
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4. Comparative Case Studies: Malaysia and the Philippines 
Our case studies augment the findings of the statistical analysis. A comparison of electoral 
authoritarianism in Malaysia (1957–present) and the Philippines (1978–1986) follows a “most similar” 
method of case selection. The countries are similar in many aspects, such as level of socio-economic 
development105 and geographic location,106 other than our variable of interest.107 In other words, 
Malaysia has adopted parliamentarism and the Philippines’s electoral authoritarianism existed within a 
semi-presidential system, while other potentially important factors influencing democratization were 
alike. We illustrate how this institutional variation has exerted a differing political impact by focusing 




Malaysia adopted the parliamentary form of government, following its colonial master, the United 
Kingdom. Since its independence from Britain in 1957 up to the time of writing of this paper (mid-
2015), Malaysia has been under an electoral authoritarian regime, where the coalition government is 
led by BN.108 BN is a multi-ethnic alliance composed of a dozen parties, but its unquestioned leader is 
the Malay-based United Malays National Opposition (UMNO), which holds around 60% of BN seats. 
Other major partners include the Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA) and the Malaysian Indian 
Congress (MIC). 
UMNO is a highly institutionalized political party with the character of a mass party.109 It was 
founded in 1946 mainly by aristocratic Malays as a reaction to Britain’s proposal for the creation of 
the Malayan Union, a post-colonial unitary state that would have reduced the traditional authorities of 
sultans. The party started as a loose gathering of local Malay-based associations with 110,000 
members.110 Half a century later, it had developed into a hierarchical organization with more than 2 
million members and 16,500 branches that form the base unit of the party.111 Its president and other 
key party positions are elected by several thousand party delegates every three years.112 Financially, 
the party is stable and rich, with its corporate holdings valued at more than 1 billion US dollars.113 
With the aforementioned characteristics of a well-institutionalized party, UMNO has 
functioned as a credible power-sharing device for regime elites. For example, succession in UMNO 
                                                      
105Both are classified as middle-income countries by the World Bank. When the Philippines democratized in 1986, its GDP 
per capita was 535 USD, while Malaysia’s was 1,741 USD in the same year (World Bank 2012). In light of the “Lipset 
hypothesis” (countries with higher levels of socio-economic development are more likely to democratize), a theoretical 
expectation is that Malaysia should democratize ahead of the Philippines. 
106 Both are members of the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN). Unlike other regional organizations such as 
the EU and OAS, ASEAN does not specifically promote democracy among its members. Some might point out that the 
Philippines’ close ties with the US government could have put the country under pressure for democratization. However, 
the Regan administration pressured Marcos to democratize (asked him to resign) after the military defections in February 
1986 (Franco 2001, 181). 
107 One potentially important difference is the democratic past: the Philippines experienced democracy from the early 20th 
century until the martial law in 1972 (the first legislative election was held in 1907 for the National Assembly, and the 
first presidential election was held in 1935), while Malaysia has been under electoral authoritarianism since independence 
from British rule. One could argue that because of this difference, the Philippines had experienced stronger 
democratizing pressure and thus a shorter authoritarian period. We do not agree with this claim, since the democracy 
movement has been quite strong in Malaysia over the past decade, to the extent that the opposition coalition won the 
majority of votes in 2013. 
108 The BN was called the Allied from 1957 to 1974, and has adopted the name BN since 1974. 
109 cf. Duverger (1959). To read about the organizational characteristics and development of UMNO, see Funston (1980). 
110 Stockwell (1977). 
111 Levitsky and Way (2010). 
112 The delegates are elected by each party branch. The number of voting delegates has increased to 100,000 since 2013 (The 
Economist, September 28, 2013) 
113 Gomez and Sundaram (1999). 
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leadership has been relatively smooth. Thus far, there have been six UMNO presidents, who also 
became prime ministers: Abdul Rahman, Abdul Razak Hussein, Hussein Onn, Mahathir Mohamad, 
Abdullah Ahmad Badawi, and Najib Razak. All climbed the career ladder within UMNO to be elected 
first as the party leader and then as the prime minister. When they   with the exception of Najib 
Razak, who is currently in office   left the position of prime minister, a new leader was elected by the 
party convention. These leadership changes caused little disruption within the party, except in 1987,114 
or to electoral performance following the leadership succession. 
Another indication of UMNO’s power-sharing function is seen in the very few number of 
defections to the opposition camp; stories of defection are rare, and any defectors have been seriously 
punished through UMNO’s access to state power. In the late 1980s, ex-Finance Minister Tengku 
Razaleigh challenged the leadership of Mahathir Mohamad as party president. After lengthy legal 
battles, Razaleigh and his followers formed a party called Semangat ’46 (Spirit of ’46). In its electoral 
bid in 1990, Mahathir successfully persuaded candidates of Semangat to rejoin UMNO with carrots 
(patronage) and sticks (e.g., threats of tax audit). Another famous breakaway was Anwar Ibrahim, the 
vice president of UMNO and deputy prime minister until 1997 who became increasingly critical of 
Mahathir’s leadership.115 Mahathir purged Anwar and his allies in 1998; Anwar was charged with 
corruption and sodomy and spent 7 years in prison. 
With regard to electoral manipulation, UMNO leaders have extra tools that presidential 
autocrats do not: malapportionment and gerrymandering in parliamentary elections. This is not to say 
that UMNO has not resorted to the usual list of manipulative activities—such as vote buying, ballot 
stuffing, using government machinery, and physically harassing opposition candidates and 
supporters—indeed reports abound that they do engage in these practices.116 In addition, BN has 
apportioned a larger number of seats to their strongholds, and drawn district lines so that they can gain 
the districts supported by the opposition. In comparative terms, Malaysia has one of the highest levels 
of malapportionment in the world, on a par with countries such as Kenya and Tanzania, and many 
scholars have pointed out BN’s heavy reliance on gerrymandered constituency boundaries in order to 
secure their seats.117 While some of the tools of electoral manipulation are illegal, these are legally 
sanctioned because the Constitution has been amended to allow for allocation of more seats for rural 
areas, and also because the parliamentary majority, not the Election Commission, has the final 
decision-making authority over delimitation.118 
These manipulations of the electoral system “saved” the BN regime at the 2013 election. As 
shown in Figure 4, BN won only 47.4% of the popular vote but 59.9% of the seats. The opposition 
coalition Pakatan Rakyat, on the other hand, won 50.9% of popular votes and 40.1% of seats. This 
disproportionality (the gap between the vote share and seat share) is to the result of institutionally 
induced mechanisms only available in parliamentary elections, namely, the adoption of a single-
member plurality system, malapportionment, and gerrymandering of constituencies. 
After the 2013 election, the opposition forces protested against the results, but to no avail. The 
main issues they raised were BN’s manipulation, such as harassing opposition candidates, creating 
phantom voters to vote for them by holding rallies, and using indelible ink that was easily removed.119 
The opposition also denounced malapportionment and gerrymandering, but it is difficult to bring these 
issues to court because, at least formally, this must be done according to constitutional procedures.120 
 
                                                      
114 In 1987, when Prime Minister Mahathir was up for re-election for the UMNO presidency, Tengku Razaleigh Hamzah 
challenged his bid; this resulted in the “Constitutional Crisis of 1988” (Lee, 1995). 
115 Initially, Anwar’s protest was made with the purpose of returning to UMNO, but it later changed to an anti-UMNO 
movement (Malay Mail, September 9, 1998, cited in Masuhara and Suzuki, 2014, 221). 
116 e.g., Pemantau (2014). 
117 Lim (2005); Ong (2005). 
118 Lim (2005). 
119 Pemantau (2014). 
120 Author’s interview with Maria Chin, Executive Director of Bershi 2.0, April 30, 2015, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. 




Figure 4 Lower Chamber Election Results in Malaysia (1959–2013) 
 
Source: Compiled by the authors based on Chin and Wong (2009) and Ostwald (2013). 
 
In sum, the parliamentary system in Malaysia has contributed to the longevity of the BN regime in two 
respects. First, it contributed to the institutionalization of UMNO, which in turn facilitated credible 
power sharing among regime elites. Second, the SMD plurality system with high degrees of 
gerrymandering and malapportionment led to a highly disproportional votes-to-seats transformation, 
which in turn sustained the majority status of BN. Particularly in 2013 election, BN lost the popular 
vote but still won the majority of seats because of the highly disproportional electoral system. If the 
election was conducted with a nationwide constituency electing the chief executive, the Pakatan 
Rakyat could have replaced BN, possibly ending Malaysia’s competitive authoritarian regime. 
 
Philippines, 1978–1986 
Although the dictatorship under Ferdinando Marcos spanned from the declaration of martial law in 
1972 to the People Power Revolution in 1986, the period that classifies electoral authoritarianism is 
between 1978 and 1986, because there was no national-level election for the first six years of martial 
law. Legislative elections were held in 1978 and 1984, and presidential elections took place in 1981 
and 1986. 
For most of the period of electoral authoritarian rule in the Philippines, a semi-presidential 
form of government was in place. Since independence in 1946, the country has employed a pure 
presidential form of government. With the ratification of the 1973 Constitution, this was replaced with 
a system of modified parliamentary government.121 The chief executive (called the President) was 
elected from the legislature (the National Assembly), although the chief executive was not responsible 
to the legislature122. The National Assembly changed its official name to the Batasan Pambansa 
(National Legislature) in the 1976 Constitutional amendment. In 1981, the Constitution was further 
amended and a semi-presidential form of government was installed. This period (1981–1986) is often 
referred to as the Fourth Republic. With this amendment, the President was elected directly by voters 
for a fixed period of 6 years, without any limit to the number of terms. At the same time, the Prime 
Minister is elected by Batasan Pambansa, to which he is responsible. The President can dissolve the 
                                                      
121 This term is used in Batas Pambansa Bilang 122. 
122 The Vice President, who is also elected by the National Assembly, may be nominated and elected as Prime Minister 
(Article VII, Section 2). 
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legislature, as in the presidential-parliamentary variant of semi-presidentialism.123 Philippines 
specialists analyze that semi-presidentialism was adopted largely because Marcos gave in to pressure 
from opposition politicians.124 
Shortly before the 1978 legislative election, Marcos organized an umbrella coalition called the 
New Society Movement for the Nationalists, Liberals, and Others (Kilusang Bagong Lipunan ng mga 
Nacionalista, Liberal at Iba Pa, hereafter KBL.125 While it became an accredited political party in late 
1979, as its full name suggests it was primarily just a mixture of his supporters and politicians 
formerly affiliated with the Nationalista Party (NP) and the Liberal Party (LP), which were the two 
major parties before the collapse of democracy. 
KBL was a typical cadre party126 with few features of institutionalization. Jose Abueva, a 
prominent Filipino political scientist and a contemporary of Marcos, quipped that the KBL “wasn’t 
even an organization”.127 Traditionally, pre-martial law parties (NP and LP) never developed well-
institutionalized organizations; they did not have grassroots party branches as UMNO has had. In most 
cases, local “party organizations” were personally managed by individual politicians, and party 
switching was frequent.128 It can be said that KBL inherited many of the features of NP and LP 
because many KBL members were former members of those parties; for example, KBL suffered from 
defection to other parties. Salvador Laurel, a scion of a prominent political family from the province of 
Batangas, ran under the banner of KBL in 1978, but broke away after the election and later founded a 
new party called the United Nationalist Democratic Organization (UNIDO).129 Shortly before the 1980 
local election, Marcos issued a “turncoat ban” decree that prohibits switching parties six months 
before election day. Such a decree was motivated by the fact that many local politicians had, or were 
about to, desert KBL. 
Unlike UMNO leaders, it is difficult to find evidence that Marcos tried to build KBL using 
state resources. His regime belongs to the personalistic regime subcategory, often dubbed as a 
conjugal dictatorship130 or sultanistic regime131. Marcos concentrated political power in the hands of 
himself, his wife, and a narrow circle of cronies. The legislature was bypassed as he ruled through 
issuing presidential decrees, and only a few of his crony capitalists were KBL politicians.132 During 
the election campaign, Marcos did help KBL candidates by providing them with material resources, 
and by manipulating the Election Commission to boost their votes. Yet these activities were not 
effective in creating loyalty to the party among KBL members per se, as indicated by the quick 
dissolution of KBL after the Marcos regime collapsed. 
The presidential elections were held twice under the Fourth Republic, in 1981 and 1986. 
Marcos won in 1981 with 88% of votes, partly because the main opposition party boycotted the 
election. In February 1986, Marcos called for a snap election, ahead of the constitutionally determined 
date of May 1987 because of pressure from the opposition and the U.S. government to put his 
                                                      
123 Shugart (2005). Batas Pambansa Bilang 122. One month before the ratification of the 1981 Constitutional amendment, 
Marcos lifted Martial Law.  
124 Asano (1992), 153. For example, in 1979 the leaders of LP released a public statement demanding a return to 
presidentialism, and in 1980, an NL stalwart Salvador Laurel submitted a resolution to IBP asking for the return of 
presidentialism that assembled 70 signatures of IBP members. 
125 Celoza (1997). 
126 c.f. Duverger (1959). 
127 Slater (2010). 
128 Marcos himself was a “turncoat,” a politician who switched parties for electoral convenience. He switched from LP to NP 
when he lost his bid to become the presidential nominee for LP in 1961. 
129 The alleged reason was that Marcos undermined his political stature by ensuring that his vote count slipped behind that of 
two Cabinet members running on the ruling party ticket in the same region (Franco 2001, 156). 
130 Mijares (1976). 
131 Thompson (1998). 
132 There were some exceptions. For example, Danding Cojuango, who was one of the crony capitalists close to Marcos, also 
had the title of KBL vice president for Luzon. 
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legitimacy to popular test. Marcos ran as the administration presidential candidate being the incumbent 
president, while the opposition forces unified themselves to support the candidacy of Corazon Aquino, 
the wife of the popular assassinated senator Benigno Aquino Jr. 
In the wake of the presidential election on February 7, conflicting results were reported.133 On 
the one hand, the official result, counted by the Commission on Elections, declared Marcos the winner 
with 53.6% of the vote. On the other hand, the independent election observer, the National Citizen’s 
Movement for Free Elections (NAMFREL), announced that Aquino won with 51.5% of the votes.134 
From the grassroots level to the national tallying process, there were numerous reports about Marcos’ 
cheating. These reports, together with the dubious nature of the official result, sparked civic revolt, 
which in turn prompted a faction of the military to defect on February 21. In the following days, 
hundreds of thousands of civilian protesters gathered at Epifiano De La Santos Avenue (EDSA) to 
protest against Marcos and protect military rebels from a government offensive. On the evening of 
February 25, Marcos fled to Hawaii on a US Air Force plane and his 14 years as dictator ended. If 
Marcos had conducted a parliamentary election with high degrees of malapportionment and 
gerrymandering, he would still have legitimately won a majority of seats regardless of which vote 
count was correct, as happened in Malaysia’s 2013 election, and therefore would have lengthened his 
reign. 
The above comparison of electoral authoritarianism in Malaysia and the Philippines suggests 
that Malaysia’s parliamentary system of government has contributed to UMNO’s long reign over the 
last 57 years by helping to institutionalize the party, fragment the opposition, and manipulate elections 
through malapportionment and gerrymandering. The Marcos regime, on the other hand, with a semi-
presidential form of government, could not benefit from these methods and lasted only 14 years. 
 
5. Conclusion 
Although many scholars have labeled the parliamentary system as virtuous,135 our analyses in this 
paper suggest that it could be a peril136 to democracy in the sense that it can prolong electoral 
authoritarianism. This happens because a parliamentary system of government is likely to impart the 
following: the ruling party becomes more institutionalized and can function as a power-sharing device 
among authoritarian elites; and the governing elite has a wider menu of electoral manipulation tactics 
to win elections. We have examined whether electoral authoritarian regimes with parliamentary forms 
of government tend to survive longer than those adopting presidential or semi-presidential systems 
through statistical and case-study methods, and both types of analyses support our claim. 
In addition, the present study provides some implications for the unresolved issue of the actual 
level of influence political institutions have on authoritarian survival. As we noted in the Introduction, 
conflicting observations and arguments have been made about this issue. For example, in some cases 
autocrats have used the legislature to divide and conquer opposition parties,137 but in other cases, they 
have failed to do so.138 As for the role of ruling parties, scholars seem to agree that an institutionalized 
ruling party lengthens regime survival. Yet it is puzzling why some dictators succeed in 
institutionalizing the ruling party (Malaysia’s UMNO, Zimbabwe’s ZANU-PF, and United Russia 
under Putin), while others fail (e.g., Kyrgyzstan, Marcos’s Philippines). Similarly, some elections 
triggered the ousting of autocrats (e.g., Georgia in 2003, Ukraine in 2004, and the Philippines in 
1986), but others have contributed to prolonging authoritarian rule (Malaysia, Egypt, Kazakhstan, 
Russia, and Singapore). One way to reconcile these conflicting observations is to incorporate the 
dimension of executive–legislative structure into the institutional analyses. Under the parliamentary 
system, legislatures tend to become a tool to develop an institutionalized ruling party, and deftly 
                                                      
133 For the sequence of events around the time of the February Revolution, see Thompson (1995). 
134 The civic group count was performed by NAMFREL. The vote result figures are from Nohlen et al. (2001, 221–228). 
135 Linz (1990b); Horowitz (1990); Lijphart (1991). 
136 c.f. Linz (1990a). 
137 Lust-Okar (2004). 
138 Gandhi and Reuter (2013). 
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manipulate election results, whereas these abilities may be absent in presidential and semi-presidential 
systems. Our statistical analyses and comparative case studies of Malaysia and the Philippines suggest 
functions of these seemingly democratic institutions in autocracies may be different depending on 
executive–legislative relations. 
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Web Appendix  
 
This supplementary appendix shows additional analyses and robustness checks that were not included 
in the main text because of limited space.  
 
Appendix A shows descriptive statistics of the mail variables.  
 
Appendix B and Table B-1 explain how to interpret the results of the three-state dynamic 
probit models employed in Models 1-4 in Table 1.    
 
Appendix C shows the results of robustness checks.  Broadly, the tables and figures of the 
robustness checks contain the following methodological issues: (1) model comparison between 
Roberts’ (2015) and ours (Table C-1),  (2) different estimation methods (Tables C-2 and C-3), (3) 
heteroskedasticity within regions (Table C-4). (4) time dependence (Table C-5), and (5) additional 
controls (Table C-6).  
 
Appendix D shows a list of electoral authoritarian countries (1945-2010) analyzed in the 
paper.   
 
Appendix E presents the results of additional analyses to test causal mechanisms. 
Specifically, the tables report the determinants of dominant party construction (Table E-1) and 
electoral fraud (Table E-2).  
 
Appendix F lists data sources for the cross-national statistical analyses.  
 
Appendix G reports estimation results of the first model in instrumental variables estimation 
(Models 7 and 8 in Table 1).   
 
• Table B-1: Presents the original results of the three-state dynamic probit models.  
 
• Table C-1: Compares our models of democratic transitions with Roberts’ (2015) 
models of autocratic breakdown.  World Share of Democracy is the yearly mean of the proportion of 
democratic countries in the world (using Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland’s (2009) dichotomous 
measure of democracy and dictatorship). Autocratic regime breakdown is identified using Geddes et 
al. (2014). Data sources of the other variables are identical with the main analysis.        
 
• Table C-2: These models employ random-effects probit estimation to take into 
account country-specific heterogeneities.  
 
• Table C-3: These models employ logistic regressions to investigate whether the 
results are sensitive to an alternative functional form of non-linear models.    
 
• Table C-4: These models use region-clustered robust standard errors to deal with 
possible correlations within regions. 
 
• Table C-5: The models employ either (1) time lapse since the last democratic 
transitions and three cubic splines or (2) cubic time polynominals to deal with possible time 
dependence in binary dependent variable models.   
 
 
• Table C-6: These models include additional relevant control variables.  
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o Economic Growth (% of GDP): Measured by using World Development Indicators.   
 
o Ethno-Linguistic Fractionalization (ELF): Measured by Philip Roeder’s (2009) 
Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization (ELF) Indices for 1961 and 1985. The higher scores indicate more 
ethnically diverse countries.  
 
o Logged Population: Measured by using total population in World Development 
Indicators.  The variable is logged.  
 
o Urban Population (% of total population): Taken from World Development 
Indicators.  
  
o Authoritarian Regime Types (Military, Personalist, and Dominant Party 
Regimes): Measured by using Geddes et al. (2014). When introducing the variables, monarchy 
regimes are used as the reference category.   
 
• Table E-1: Shows the results of determinants of dominant party regimes. All the three 
models employ probit regression with regional and half-decade dummies. The dependent variable, 
Dominant Party Regime, is binary taken from Geddes et al. (2014).  
 
o In the first model, we estimate the effect of parliamentalism on the probability of the 
emergence of dominant party regimes without introducing control variables.  
 
o In the second model, we introduce relevant control variables that may affect dominant 
party emergence such as logged GDP per capita, economic growth, natural resource wealth, leader’s 
length of tenure, total population, and ethno-linguistic fractionalization.  
 
o In the third model, we use instrumental variables estimation in which the executive-
legislative relations variable is instrumented by colonial origins (i.e. British and French colonies).       
 
• Table E-2: Shows the results of determinants of electoral fraud in electoral 
authoritarian regimes. Using a country-election year dataset, all the three models employ probit 
regression. The dependent variable, Electoral Fraud, is binary taken from Hyde and Marinov’s 
(2012) NELDA 11. NELDA 11 provides a dichotomous assessment of whether there are significant 
concerns that elections will not be free and fair before elections.  Based on previous work on electoral 
manipulation, we introduce the following control variables.  
 
o Logged GDP per capita (one year lagged): Measured by using World Development 
Indicators.   
 
o Economic Growth (% of GDP, one year lagged): Measured by using World 
Development Indicators.   
o Freedom House Index (3 year moving average lagged by one year): Higher value 
indicates less repressive countries. According to Hafner-Burton et al. (2014), extent of political 
repression in non-election years affects electoral fairness.  
  
o Election Administrative Capacity: Measured by Kelley’s (2012) Quality of 
Elections (QOE) Dataset. Independent, professional electoral management bodies improve the quality 
of elections (Hartlyn, McCoy, and Mustillo. 2008). Higher values indicate better election 
administrative capacity.   
 
o Leader’s Tenure Length (one year lagged): Measured by using Goemans et al. 
(2009) Archigos 2.9.   




o Rural Population (% of total population, one year lagged): Measured by World 
Development Indicators. In rural societies authoritarian governments find it easier to engage in 
electoral fraud (Burch 2011, 62).  
 
o Domestic Election Monitoring: Measured by using Kelley’s (2012) QOE. Domestic 
Election Monitoring is effective to lower the level of fraud (Ichino and Schuendeln 2012). We use 
Kelley’s (2012) dummy variable identifying whether domestic election monitoring exists in a given 
election.  
 
o International Election Monitoring: Measured by using Kelley’s (2012) QOE. The 
presence of international election monitoring tends to improve election fairness (Hyde 2007; Kelley 
2012). We use Kelley’s (2012) dummy variable identifying whether international election monitoring 
exists in a given election.  
 
o Foreign Aid (% of GDP, one year lagged): Measured by Ahmed (2012). The more 
dependent a country is on foreign aid, the more likely it may be to hold less fraudulent elections 
because of concern for their international reputation.  
 
o Authoritarian Regimes Types (Party, Military, and Personalist, one year lagged): 
Measured by Geddes et al. (2014). Military dictators are more likely to step down and thus may allow 
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Appendix A: Descriptive Statistics of the Cross-National Statistical Analysis 
 
For more detail information on the data sources, see Appendix F. 




Appendix B: Modeling Three-State Dynamic Probit Model 





where  and  are regime categories for country  during year and  is a function from 
the  interval to the probit . The equation models the idea that variables should have 
different impacts on the probabilities of a regime type  at t year, depending on a regime type at 
(t−1) year. 
 
Table B-1: Trichotomous Measure of Political Regimes 
 
 
We follow Epstein et al. (2006) to estimate three-state dynamic logit models. In our case, there are 
three ordered categories of the dependent variable (closed authoritarianism: , electoral 
authoritarianism:  1, and democracy: ). We introduce two dummy variables  
to model Markov logit regressions. When two dummy variables in the table above interact with each 
independent variable, it becomes possible to estimate different effects of the variables on political 
regime change at t year, depending on a regime type at  year. As we focus on transitions to 
democracy, , we can express Markov logit regressions for the impact of a variable  on 




where  are both lagged by 1 year. To assess the impact of X on democratic transitions from 
electoral authoritarianism, we need to focus on the summed coefficients ( where 
 (cf. For democracy to democracy, the coefficient is just 
. For closed authoritarianism to democracy, the coefficient is 
. We use a Chi-squared joint test to assess statistical significance for the summed 
coefficient ( , which is easily computed through a post-estimation command in STATA 13.1. 
Table B-2 shows original results using the dummy variables (  and their 
interactions with the independent variables. For example, in Model 3, the coefficient of the executive–
legislative relations variable (Presidentialism: 0, Parliamentarism: 1) for the transition from Electoral 
Authoritarianism to Democracy can be calculated as 0.375 – 0.658 = −0.283, which is identical to the 
coefficient shown in Table 1. Conducting a joint Chi-squared test, it turns out that the p-value is equal 










The Peril of Parliamentarism? 
35 
 
Table B-1: Dynamic Probit Estimation Results  
 
Note: Clustered robust standard errors in parentheses. *** denotes significance at the 0.01 level; ** denotes 
significance at the 0.05 level; * denotes significance at the 0.1 level. All variables included are lagged by one 
year to mitigate simultaneity bias. The Executive-Legislative Relations” variable is a dummy variable (0: 
presidential systems, 1: assembly-elected president or parliamentary systems). Models B-1 and B-2 correspond 
with Models 1 and 2 in Table 1. Model B-3 corresponds to Models 3 in Table 1. Models B-4 corresponds to 
Model 4 in Table 1.  





Appendix C: Robustness Checks 
 
Table C-1: Democratization vs Authoritarian Breakdown  
 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Following Roberts (2015), we mainly employ a random-effects logistic 
model with cubic time polynominals.   
 
 
Table C-2: Random-Effects Dynamic Probit 
 
Note: P-values in parentheses. P-values are computed using standard errors and a joint Chi squared test for the 
variable of interest and its interaction with a regime type at (t-1) year. *** denotes significance at the 0.01 level; 
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** denotes significance at the 0.05 level; * denotes significance at the 0.1 level. All variables included are lagged 
by one year. “EA => D” indicates transitions from electoral authoritarianism to democracy.  Regarding how to 
model three-state dynamic probit models, see Appendix B. The executive-legislative relations variable is a 
dummy variable (0: presidential systems, 1: assembly-elected president or parliamentary systems). 
 
 
Table C-3: Dynamic Logit Models 
 
Note: P-values in parentheses. P-values are computed using clustered robust standard errors and a joint Chi 
squared test for the variable of interest and its interaction with a regime type at (t-1) year. *** denotes 
significance at the 0.01 level; ** denotes significance at the 0.05 level; * denotes significance at the 0.1 level. All 
variables included are lagged by one year. “EA => D” indicates transitions from electoral authoritarianism to 
democracy. Regarding how to model three-state dynamic probit models, see Appendix B. The executive-

























Table C-4: Region-Clustered Robust Standard Errors  
 
Note: P-values in parentheses. P-values are computed using region-clustered robust standard errors and a joint 
Chi squared test for the variable of interest and its interaction with a regime type at (t-1) year. *** denotes 
significance at the 0.01 level; ** denotes significance at the 0.05 level; * denotes significance at the 0.1 level. All 
variables included are lagged by one year. “EA => D” indicates transitions from electoral authoritarianism to 
democracy. Regarding how to model three-state dynamic probit models, see Appendix B. The executive-
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Table C-5: Time Dependence  
 
Note: P-values in parentheses. For dynamic probit models, p-values are computed using clustered robust 
standard errors and a joint Chi squared test for the variable of interest and its interaction with a regime type at (t-
1) year. *** denotes significance at the 0.01 level; ** denotes significance at the 0.05 level; * denotes 
significance at the 0.1 level. All variables included are lagged by one year. “EA => D” indicates transitions from 
electoral authoritarianism to democracy. Regarding how to model three-state dynamic probit models, see 
Appendix B. The executive-legislative relations variable is a dummy variable (0: presidential systems, 1: 

































Table C-6: Additional Controls 
 
Note: P-values in parentheses. For dynamic probit models, p-values are computed using clustered robust 
standard errors and a joint Chi squared test for the variable of interest and its interaction with a regime type at (t-
1) year. *** denotes significance at the 0.01 level; ** denotes significance at the 0.05 level; * denotes 
significance at the 0.1 level. All variables included are lagged by one year. “EA => D” indicates transitions from 
electoral authoritarianism to democracy. Regarding how to model three-state dynamic probit models, see 
Appendix B. The executive-legislative relations variable is a dummy variable (0: presidential systems, 1: 
assembly-elected president or parliamentary systems). 
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Appendix D: List of Electoral Authoritarian Regimes (1945-2010) 
 
Note: “Pres” -- Presidentialism, “Par” – Parliamentarism or assembly-elected president. The countries listed 
above are all electoral authoritarian regimes satisfying (1) opposition parties are legal, (2) opposition parties are 
allowed to join elections, and (3) more than one candidate exist in elections (Hyde and Marinov 2012; Kinne and 
Marinov 2013).   




Appendix E: Additional Data Analyses 
 
Table E-1: Determinants of Dominant Party Regimes 
 
Note: Figure 3a is drawn based on Model 10. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** denotes significance at 
the 0.01 level; ** denotes significance at the 0.05 level; * denotes significance at the 0.1 level. All variables 
included are lagged by one year. The executive-legislative relations variable is a dummy variable (0: presidential 
systems, 1: assembly-elected president or parliamentary systems). Using Conditional Mixed Process (CMP) 
regression (Roodman 2011), Model 11 estimate IV probit models by setting British and French colonies as 
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Table E-2: Determinants of Electoral Fraud  
 
Note: Figure 3b is drawn based on Model 14. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** denotes significance at 
the 0.01 level; ** denotes significance at the 0.05 level; * denotes significance at the 0.1 level. The executive-
legislative relations variable is a dummy variable (0: presidential systems, 1: assembly-elected president or 
parliamentary systems). 
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Heston, Alan, Robert Summers, and Bettina Aten, Penn World Table Version 7.1, Center for  
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Inter-Parliamentary Union. http://www.ipu.org/parline-e/parlinesearch.asp 
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     University Press. 
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Appendix G: First Model of Instrumental Variables Estimation 
  
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** denotes significance at the 0.01 level; ** denotes significance 
at the 0.05 level; * denotes significance at the 0.1 level. 
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